

IN THE MATTER OF
STERGIOS NIKIDES AND JOHN LAKIS TRADING AS
NIKIDES & LAKIS

ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE FUR PRODUCTS LABELING ACTS

Docket 6535. Complaint, Mar. 22, 1956—Decision, Oct. 23, 1956

Consent order requiring furriers in New York City, to cease violating the Fur Products Labeling Act by failing to show on invoices when their fur products contained bleached or artificially colored fur.

Mr. John T. Walker for the Commission.

Mr. Stergios Nikides and *Mr. John Lakis*, of New York City, for respondents.

INITIAL DECISION BY ABNER E. LIPSCOMB, HEARING EXAMINER

The complaint herein was issued on March 22, 1956, alleging that the Respondents are, and subsequent to August 9, 1952, the effective date of the Fur Products Labeling Act, have been using unfair and deceptive acts and practices in commerce by falsely and deceptively invoicing certain of their fur products, in violation of the Fur Products Labeling Act, the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

On June 27, 1956, Respondents and counsel supporting the complaint entered into an Agreement Containing Consent Order To Cease And Desist, which was approved by the Director and the Assistant Director of the Commission's Bureau of Litigation, and thereafter submitted to the Hearing Examiner for consideration.

Respondents Stergios Nikides and John Lakis are identified in the agreement as individuals and copartners trading as Nikides & Lakis, with their office and principal place of business presently located at 333 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York.

Respondents admit all the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint and agree that the record may be taken as if findings of jurisdictional facts had been duly made in accordance with such allegations.

Respondents, in the agreement, waive any further procedure before the Hearing Examiner and the Commission; the making of findings of fact or conclusions of law; and all the rights they may have to challenge or contest the validity of the order to cease and desist entered in accordance therewith. All parties agree that the record on which the initial decision and the decision of the Com-

mission shall be based shall consist solely of the complaint and the agreement; that the order to cease and desist as contained in the agreement shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing, and may be altered, modified or set aside in the manner provided for other orders; that the complaint herein may be used in construing the terms of said order; and that the agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that they have violated the law as alleged in the complaint.

After considering the charges set forth in the complaint, and the provisions of the agreement and the proposed order, the Hearing Examiner is of the opinion that such order constitutes, a satisfactory disposition of this proceeding. Accordingly, in consonance with the terms of the aforesaid agreement, the Hearing Examiner accepts the Agreement Containing Consent Order To Cease And Desist; finds that the Commission has jurisdiction over the Respondents and over their acts and practices as alleged in the complaint; and finds that this proceeding is in the public interest. Therefore,

It is ordered, That Respondents Stergios Nikides and John Lakis, individually and as copartners trading as Nikides & Lakis, or trading under any other name or names, and Respondents' representatives, agents and employees, directly or through any corporate or other device, in connection with the introduction into commerce, or the sale, advertising, or offering for sale in commerce, or the transportation or distribution in commerce, of fur products, or in connection with the sale, advertising, offering for sale, transportation, or distribution of fur products which have been made in whole or in part of fur which has been shipped and received in commerce, as "commerce," "fur," and "Fur products" are defined in the Fur Products Labeling Act, do forthwith cease and desist from:

A. Falsely or deceptively invoicing fur products by:

1. Failing to furnish invoices to purchasers of fur products showing:

(a) The name or names of the animal or animals producing the fur or furs contained in the fur product, as set forth in the Fur Products Name Guide and as prescribed under the Rules and Regulations;

(b) That the fur product contains or is composed of used fur, when such is a fact;

(c) That the fur product contains or is composed of bleached, dyed or otherwise artificially colored fur, when such is a fact;

(d) That the fur product is composed in whole or in substantial part of paws, tails, bellies, or waste fur, when such is a fact;

Decision

53 F.T.C.

- (e) The name and address of the person issuing such invoice;
- (f) The name of the country of origin of any imported furs contained in a fur product;

B. Falsely and deceptively invoicing fur products as being made of "natural" furs when they are in fact bleached, dyed, or otherwise artificially colored.

DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AND ORDER TO FILE REPORT OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Section 3.21 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, the initial decision of the hearing examiner shall, on the 23rd day of October, 1956, become the decision of the Commission; and, accordingly:

It is ordered, That respondents Stergios Nikides and John Lakis, individually and as copartners trading as Nikides & Lakis, shall, within sixty (60) days after service upon them of this order, file with the Commission a report in writing setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they have complied with the order to cease and desist.

Decision

IN THE MATTER OF
JU-EL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.

ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE WOOL PRODUCTS LABELING ACTS

Docket 6584. Complaint, July 9, 1956—Decision, Oct. 23, 1956

Consent order requiring a manufacturer in New York City to cease violating the Wool Products Labeling Act, through labeling as "100% WOOL Exclusive of Ornamentation" skirts which contained a large percent of other fibers, failing to label certain products as required, and using, to promote sales, samples of its products that were not labeled to show fiber content.

Mr. William R. Kearney for the Commission.

Mr. Herbert G. Kreisberg, of New York City, for respondents.

INITIAL DECISION OF JOHN LEWIS, HEARING EXAMINER

The Federal Trade Commission issued its complaint against the above-named respondents on July 9, 1956, charging them with having violated the Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939 and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, through the misbranding of certain wool products. After being served with said complaint, respondents appeared by counsel and entered into an agreement containing consent order to cease and desist, dated September 4, 1956, purporting to dispose of all of this proceeding as to all parties. Said agreement, which has been signed by all respondents, by counsel for said respondents, and by counsel supporting the complaint, and approved by the Director and Assistant Director of the Commission's Bureau of Litigation, has been submitted to the above-named hearing examiner for his consideration, in accordance with Section 3.25 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Respondents, pursuant to the aforesaid agreement, have admitted all the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint, and have agreed that the record may be taken as if findings of jurisdictional facts had been made in accordance with such allegations. Said agreement further provides that respondents waive any further procedural steps before the hearing examiner and the Commission, the making of findings of fact or conclusions of law, and all of the rights they may have to challenge or contest the validity of the order to cease and desist entered in accordance with said agreement. It has also been agreed that the order to cease and desist issued in accordance with said agreement shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and that the complaint may be