

Set Aside Order

119 F.T.C.

IN THE MATTER OF

INDEPENDENT NEWS COMPANY, INC.

SET ASIDE ORDER IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 2 OF THE CLAYTON ACT*Docket 7611. Consent Order, July 6, 1960--Set Aside Order, June 14, 1995*

The Federal Trade Commission has reopened a 1960 consent order (57 FTC 56) -- which required the company to offer promotional allowances for its publications on proportionally equal terms to all customers -- and has set aside the consent order as to respondent Warner Publisher Services, the successor of Independent News Company, pursuant to the Commission's Sunset Policy Statement, under which the Commission presumes that the public interest requires terminating competition orders that are more than 20 years old.

ORDER REOPENING PROCEEDING
AND SETTING ASIDE ORDER

On February 16, 1995, Warner Publisher Services, Inc. ("WPS"), as respondent and successor of Independent News Company, Inc.,¹ filed a Petition to Reopen and Set Aside Consent Order ("Petition"), in this matter. WPS requests that the Commission set aside the 1960 consent order in this matter pursuant to Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(b), Rule 2.51 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 2.51, and the Statement of Policy With Respect to Duration of Competition Orders and Statement of Intention to Solicit Public Comment With Respect to Duration of Consumer Protection Orders, issued on July 22, 1994, and published at 59 Fed. Reg. 45,286-92 (Sept. 1, 1994) ("Sunset Policy Statement"). In its Petition, WPS affirmatively states that it has not engaged in any conduct violating the terms of the order. The Petition was placed on the public record, and the thirty-day comment period expired on March 27, 1995. No comments were received.

The Commission in its Sunset Policy Statement said, in relevant part, that "effective immediately, the Commission will presume, in the context of petitions to reopen and modify existing orders, that the public interest requires setting aside orders in effect for more than

¹ Since the Commission issued the order in this matter, Independent has changed its name to Warner Publisher Services, Inc. and is now owned by Warner Communications Inc. The other respondent in this matter, The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., did not petition to have the order set aside as to it.

twenty years."² The Commission's consent order in Docket No. 7611 was issued on July 6, 1960, and has been in effect for more than twenty years. Consistent with the Commission's Sunset Policy Statement, the presumption is that the order should be terminated. Nothing to overcome the presumption having been presented, the Commission has determined to reopen the proceeding and set aside the order in Docket No. 7611 as to WPS.

Accordingly, *It is ordered*, That this matter be, and it hereby is, reopened;

It is further ordered, That the Commission's order in Docket No. 7611 be, and it hereby is, set aside as to respondent Warner Publisher Services, Inc., as of the effective date of this order.

CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MARY L. AZCUENAGA

I concur in the decision to grant the request of Warner Publisher Services, Inc., the successor of Independent News Company, Inc., to set aside the 1960 order in this case. I dissent from the decision to limit the setting aside of the order to Warner, instead of setting aside the order in its entirety.

The decision to limit relief to Warner, one of the two respondents under the order, appears to be inconsistent with the Commission's announced policy to presume "that the public interest requires reopening and setting aside the order in its entirety" (emphasis added) "when a petition to reopen and modify a competition order is filed" and the order is more than twenty years old.¹ The Commission's recognition of the limitations of the findings underlying an order² further suggests that the presumption that an order will be terminated after twenty years should apply to the order in its entirety and not be limited to the petitioner.³

I previously have expressed my concern that the adoption of a presumption instead of an across-the-board rule in favor of sunset

² See Sunset Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. at 45,289.

¹ FTC, Statement of Policy with Respect to Duration of Competition Orders and Statement of Intention To Solicit Public Comment with Respect to Duration of Consumer Protection Orders (July 22, 1994), at 8 (hereafter "Sunset Policy Statement").

² "[F]indings upon which [orders] are based should not be presumed to continue" for longer than twenty years. Sunset Policy Statement at 4.

³ The presumption of termination after 20 years applies automatically for new orders in competition cases and is not limited to individual respondents, further supporting the view that the twenty-year presumption in favor of sunset for existing orders should apply to the order, not to particular respondents.

"will impose costs by requiring respondents to file individual petitions and the Commission to assess in the context of each such petition whether the presumption has been overcome for that order."⁴ Now the Commission would further increase the burden on both public and private resources by applying the presumption in favor of sunset not only on a case-by-case basis but on a respondent-by-respondent basis.

The petition filed by Warner invoked the twenty-year presumption that the order should be set aside. No evidence of recidivist conduct by any respondent, including The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., having been presented to overcome the presumption,⁵ the order should be set aside in its entirety.

⁴ Separate Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga on Sunset Policy (July 22, 1994), at 7 (footnote omitted).

⁵ See Sunset Policy Statement at 8 n.19

IN THE MATTER OF

TALEIGH CORPORATION, ET AL.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SECS. 5 AND 12 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT*Docket C-3587. Complaint, June 16, 1995--Decision, June 16, 1995*

This consent order prohibits, among other things, two marketing corporations and the owner from misrepresenting that any product is new or unique, the existence or conclusions of any test or study, or that an endorsement for any product represents the typical experience of people who use it. The consent order requires the respondents to have scientific evidence to substantiate any representation regarding the performance, benefits, efficacy or safety of any weight-loss or smoking cessation product, or for any food, dietary supplement, drug, or device. In addition, the consent order requires the owner to post a \$300,000 performance bond before marketing any weight-loss product or smoking deterrent or cessation product in the future.

Appearances

For the Commission: *Richard L. Cleland* and *Joel Winston*.
For the respondents: *Sheldon Lustigman*, New York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Taleigh Corporation and Choice Diet Products, Inc., corporations; and William J. Santamaria, individually and as an officer and director of said corporations ("respondents"), have violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, alleges:

PARAGRAPH 1. Respondent Taleigh Corporation ("Taleigh"), formerly known as Taleigh, Inc., is a Florida corporation doing business under the names "Choice Diet Products," "Choice Products," and other trade names. Its principal place of business is located at 4742 N.W. Boca Raton Boulevard, Boca Raton, FL.

Respondent Choice Diet Products, Inc. ("Choice") is a New York